The invasion of another state can be classified as an international crime and is often unjustified because it not only disrespects state borders but also state sovereignty. This would bring forth the question of whether a nation that has been unjustly invaded will always have the right to fend for themselves against the attack or would they just be participating in an unjust war. Therefore, I would argue this by taking the stance that nations that were unjustly invaded will always have a right to fight to defend itself. This claim can be justified through the points that will be presented in this paper which are: the victim nation’s decision to defend itself would satisfy the jus ad bellum conditions, every state has the natural right to self-defence and the consequences of omitting self-defence from a state is dire.
Nations will always have the right to fight to defend itself from an unjust invasion because it satisfies the jus ad bellum conditions. According to the just war theory, states would only be justified in participating in war if all the jus ad bellum conditions are met in order to minimise wars that are initiated for unjustified or illegitimate reasons. These conditions include the just cause criterion, war as a last resort, declared by proper authority, right intentions, reasonable chance of success and proportionality (Janzen 2016). On top of satisfying all the other conditions, only one just cause criterion needs to be fulfilled which in this case would be defence against aggression. This fulfills the just cause criterion as an invasion of any kind is as an act of aggression against an enemy state. According to article 2 of the United Nations charter, aggression can be defined as any first use of force that violates the UN charter (Ellen O’connell & Niyazmatov 2012). Therefore giving the victim nation the right to defend is crucial as an invasion not only violates the charter but also threatens its people, hence making it a crime against the state. Despite that, some may argue that the condition of reasonable chance of success would not be satisfied as the invading nation would have better technology and systems of warfare which would give them an advantage against the enemy. For example, an anticipatory attack was launched against Iraq in 2003 by the United States, Britain and Australia as they assumed that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction and the use of force was a form of preventative self-defence (Enemark & Michaelsen 2005, pp. 548-550). However, if the counter argument made stands, then Iraq’s decision to defend itself would be as unjust as their invaders because they do not possess the reasonable chances of success due to the invading nation’s military prowess (Enemark & Michaelsen 2005, p. 551). The condition of reasonable chance of success can never be fully realised as this would render weaker nations to always be unjustified to participate in any war, even those for self-defence while more developed nations with stronger military forces would always be justified in going to war. Nevertheless, all the other conditions such as war as a last resort, right intention, proportionality and declared by proper authority would be met when a nation faces an unjust invasion, thus justifying the state’s right for participation. Therefore, nations will always have the right to defend themselves from an unjust invasion as it satisfies all the jus ad bellum conditions.
Furthermore, nations have the right to fight against unjust invasions because every state has the natural right to self-defence. This point is made to support the argument as the natural right to self-defence is inherent for every individual and by applying the domestic analogy, states would have similar rights to those individuals. The domestic analogy proposes that states are to be treated as large individuals and by extension, would have the same rights when an individual in granted moral permissibility to use violence as a form of self-defence (Kling 2015, pp. 3-8). Contrariwise, some political pacifist might counter argue that the domestic analogy should not be applied in this context as it undermines the role of a state. This is argued because an individual’s actions to protect their community should not be compared in parallel to war due to the pressure individuals face in the moment of threat. Political pacifist supports the idea that it is morally permissible for individuals to kill in certain circumstances but the participation in war is never justified as war is an inter-state affair while individual self-defence is used with the aim of protecting one’s community (Ryan 2013). The reason political pacifist agree that an individual’s use of lethal violence is rarely permissible because an individual’s right to life is not rendered obsolete due to that person directly violating the other’s right to life. By implying that defending a nation is similar to individual self-defence, national defence would be reduced to a collection of personal rights instead of an international affair (Ronin 2012, pp. 159-162). However, this counter argument would not hold up as the ‘Russian Doll’ analogy explains that communities can vary in size from something small such as a family all the way to a national community (Ronin 2012, pp. 159-162). With this, the right for an individual to use force for self-defence and the state’s use of force for self-defence can be understood as having the similar aim of protecting its community. Hence, the domestic analogy can be applied as the states are a collective of individuals, cultures and way of life, without the right to self-defence, the threat of losing it would be imminent. As Hedley Bull quotes, “The 'domestic analogy' is the experience of individual men in domestic society to the experience of states...the conditions of an orderly social life are the same among states as they are within them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.” (cited in Kling 2015, p. 6). Bull explains that as the states are larger reproduction of its individuals, there is a fundamental need for states to defend its people the way an individual would defend its community from harm. Thus, states that have been unjustly invaded always have the right to self-defence as it is one of its natural rights.
In addition, a nation has the right to defend itself from an unjust invasion because the consequences of omitting self-defence from a nation is dire. I would argue this based on the ideals of consequentialism which understands that acting in accordance to a particular policy, such as adhering to the just war theory, may cause more needless suffering as compared to fighting just for the sake of defending one’s nation. As the consequentialists would agree, fighting with a war based on the moral permissibility set out in the principles of jus in bello against an unjust invader that ignores it would put the nation at a substantial disadvantage. By adhering to the principles of jus in bello during war, nation’s agree to fight morally such as only being allowed to target combatants and also to set out a standard of reasonable care to avoid non-combatant casualties (Boyle 1997, pp. 84-87). However, there are still those that would argue against this by basing their ideals on deontological grounds. The deontologist claim that there should always be ‘respect for persons’ in war and that the distinctions between combatants and non-combatants in jus in bello should be upheld in order to reduce calamity (Johansson 2011). Even so, this counter argument would not be applicable in an unjust invasion as jus in bello is just a convention of war-fighting which refers to a set of principles that are held up by the parties that agreed to it solely by virtue, thus implying that these principles may be abandoned at any time. As the principles of jus in bello are not as binding as the Geneva Convention which requires respect in all circumstances, it would not hold up when another party chooses to neglect it in war. As quoted by Donagan : “since nearly everybody’s judgment is disturbed by the anticipation of calamity, it is probable that much of what is done on the ground of such escape clauses will be mistaken.’ (cited in Boyle 1997, p. 95) Donagan’s quote explains the lack of loyalty to the principles of jus in bello as victory is the priority, causing high numbers of civilian casualties due to the the ignoring of distinction between combatants and non-combatants (cited in Boyle 1997, p. 95). Nevertheless, another aspect that I propose can be considered is the realist ideal, which claim that morality should not be discussed in the context of war as it would only cause the war to be more drawn out, resulting in increased numbers of casualties. The prescriptive claim in realism sets forth the ideas of prudence and morality in which states that wish to survive and develop need to forgo moral arguments and act in its self-interest for the prospect of success (Boyle 1997, pp. 21-22). Therefore, nations should not be burdened by morality and always be allowed to protect themselves when being unjustly invaded by a foreign power as the consequences of following a deontological approach would result in more civilian casualties.
To conclude, a nation should always have the right to defend itself from an unjust invasion. I would argue this because the victim nation’s participation in the conflict can be justified as they would satisfy all the jus ad bellum conditions on top of fulfilling the just cause criterion of defence against aggression. Another reason nations have the right to self-defence is because of their inherent right to practice it as it is apparent to every individual and through the domestic analogy, states would be entitled to that right as well. Even though many may argue that the domestic analogy should not be applied as it the role of the state should not be reduced to a collective of individual interest. Despite that, nations should still apply this analogy as states are in fact a collection of persons, cultures and way of life, thus not allowing the similar rights as individuals would be alluding that the state is a completely separate entity from the individuals that inhabit it. Moreover, not allowing nations such fundamental rights would bring about dire consequences as the unjust invaders are not concerned about the wellbeing of the nation and the principles of jus in bello. Hence, nations need to defend themselves and possibly adopt the consequentialist or realist perspectives by putting their self-interest to defend its nation ahead of any questions of morality in order to maintain its sovereignty and protect its people. Therefore, nations should always have the right to defend themselves from unjust invaders in order to sustain their place in the world order.
References
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Ellen O’Connell, M, & Niyazmatov, M 2012, 'What is aggression?', Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 189-207, doi : 10.1093/jicj/mqs003
Enemark, C & Michaelsen, C 2005, ‘Just war doctrine and the invasion of Iraq’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 548-551, https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2005.00393.x
Jenzen, Z 2016, ‘A critique of the right intention condition as an element of jus ad bellum’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 36-57, doi: 10.1080/15027570.2016.1170370
Johansson, L 2011, ‘Is it morally right to use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in war?’, Philosophy & Technology, vol. 24, no. 3, doi : 10.1007/s13347-011-0033-8
Kling, J 2015, ‘The state right of self-defense: A claim in need of justification’, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, pp. 3-8, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/docview/1689691477?pq-origsite=primo
Ronin, D 2002, ‘War and self-defence’, Oxford: Clarendon Press, viewed on 20 March 2018, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/lib/monash/reader.action?docID=4941859&ppg=90
Ryan, C 2013, ‘Pacifism, just war and self-defence’, Philosophia, vol. 14, no.4, pp. 977-1005, viewed on 29 April 2018, https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.lib.monash.edu.au/article/10.1007%2Fs11406-013-9493-7